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THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY: ARTICLE 9 AND
NATO’S INSTITUTIONALIZATION†
Andrés B. Muñoz Mosquera*
Article 9
The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be
represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this
Treaty. The Council shall be so organised as to be able to meet
promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies
as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a
defence committee which shall recommend measures for the
implementation of Articles 3 and 5.1

INTRODUCTION
The Charter of the United Nations (“U.N. Charter”) and its constitutional
nature provide the necessary grounds for the institutionalization, around the idea
of the promotion of international peace and security under the inspiration of
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, of “communities of interest,” like the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).2 This Note submits that NATO is a
“community of interest,” where the constituents have vested the necessary legal
framework based on the U.N. Charter. NATO’s legal order is not only part of
public international law, but also contributes to the most constitutional part of
public international law, the U.N. Charter.
Over time, a series of NATO structures and procedures have been created—
i.e., international institutions—to implement the goals of the North Atlantic
Treaty (“Treaty”) and, thus, contribute to achieve the frontispiece of the U.N.
Charter, i.e., the maintenance of international peace and security. Although the
“O” in NATO was not expressly mentioned in the Treaty,3 it is evident from
†
This Article contains views provided in the author’s personal capacity and may not reflect agreed upon
views of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Allied Command Operations (ACO) or
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
*
NATO Commander’s Legal Advisor, Director of the ACO/SHAPE Office of Legal Affairs.
1
North Atlantic Treaty, art. 9, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243.
2
Future Development of NATO, Other than in Connection with Defence Plans: Note by the Executive
Secretary, NATO ARCHIVES, (Sept. 19, 1951), archives.nato.int/uploads/r/null/1/9/19674/C_7-D_18_ENG.pdf
(“The preservation of peace is the very essence of that [North Atlantic] community.”).
3
The word “Organization” appears first in the text of the communiqué of the first meeting of the NAC
and it was materialized due to the signs sent by the Korea War and the deteriorating situation in the Eastern
Flank of Europe, which made the Allies create the Supreme Headquarters Allied Forces Europe (SHAPE) in
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Article 9, that among the primary intentions of the drafters was that of giving
options to the constituent states in order to turn an “alliance” into an
“organization” as and when deemed appropriate.4 This intention becomes
explicit in September 1948 with discussions of “adequate machinery for
implementing [the Treaty] terms,”5 the “[r]esolution to combine their efforts in
a North Atlantic Organization designed effectively to accomplish these aims in
accordance with the purposes and principles of the [U.N.] Charter,”6 and the
“[p]rovision for establishment of agencies necessary for the effective
implementation of the Treaty.”7 This particularity makes NATO’s
institutionalization an interesting field of research and study to track the process
of creating NATO institutions. Indeed, France’s plenipotentiaries presented
NATO’s dichotomy of “alliance” and “organization” during the preliminaries of
its withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military structure in 1966. Some of the
most senior French leaders stated that France left the “Organization” while it
remained an active member to the “Alliance.’”8
With Article 9 and the “rules of the organization”9 as the setting for NATO’s
institutionalization, NATO’s institutionalization is not a snapshot of history but
a reactive, dynamic, and continuous process.
The sections below describe the original elements of NATO’s
institutionalization, focusing on Article 9 and its interaction with other key
Articles of the Treaty.

I.

ARTICLE 9 AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

Through Article 9, the drafters of the Treaty established the North Atlantic
Council (NAC) to implement the Treaty provisions. The NAC is the main

December 1950. See Final Communiqué of the first Session of the North Atlantic Council, Sep. 17, 1949. “The
organization established under the North Atlantic Treaty should be operated with as much flexibility as possible
and be subject to review from time to time. The establishment of this machinery does not preclude the use of
other means for consultation and co-operation between any or all of the Parties on matters relating to the Treaty,”
Id. (emphasis added).
4
See North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1, art. 9.
5
Memorandum by the Participants in the Washington Security Talks, July 6 to September 9, Submitted
to Their Respective Governments for Study and Comment in F OREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED S TATES ,
1949, W ESTERN E UROPE , III, 243–47 OFFICE OF THE H ISTORIAN (1948) (emphasis added).
6
Id. (emphasis added).
7
Id. (emphasis added).
8
Jean Charpentier, Organisation de l’Europe: Le Retrait Français de l’OTAN, 12 ANNUAIRE FRANÇAIS
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, 409, 411 (1966).
9
“Article 2 (b) ‘rules of the organization’ means, in particular, the constituent instruments, decisions,
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political decision-making body of NATO, controlling the political and military
bodies of the organization. Secondary and tertiary decision-making bodies are
the subordinate boards and committees—NATO’s committee system,10 an
equivalent to EU “comitology.”11
The NAC is composed of representatives from all NATO Member States12
and convenes at four levels: (a) permanent representatives; (b) foreign ministers;
(c) defense ministers; and (d) heads of state and government.13 NAC decisions,
regardless of the level, have the same status.14 The Secretary General is not the
head of NATO; rather (s)he supports NATO’s constituents by chairing the NAC
and providing it with a secretariat.15 The Secretary General ensures that NAC’s
decisions are executed, recorded, and circulated.16 The Secretary General relies
on a small Secretariat—the International Secretariat/Staff—that takes care of
organizational and logistical matters to enable the NAC’s work and support the
work of boards and committees.17 The Chairman of the Military Committee
(MC) presides over the military representatives and serves, inter alia, as a link
between the political leaders of NATO Headquarters and the two Strategic
Commanders.18 The MC is supported by the International Military Staff.19 The
resolutions and other acts of the international organizations adopted in accordance with those instruments, and
established practice of the organization” Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of its Sixty-Third Session, U.N.
Doc. A/66/10, at 49 (2011)[hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/66/10].
10
Bjarne Eriksen, The Committee System of the NATO Council N.Y. HUMANITIES PRESS 66 (1967).“Over
the years, the Council has established a network of committees to facilitate the Alliance’s work and deal with all
subjects on its agenda. The principal NATO committees are the NAC, the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) and
the Military Committee (MC). The Defence Planning Committee (DPC), which was also one of NATO’s top
decision-making bodies, was dissolved under the June 2010 committee reform and its functions were taken over
by the NAC.”Id. Although there are many more boards and committees preparing NAC’s decisions. Committees,
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (Oct. 12, 2017), www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49174.htm.
11
Comitology, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, ec.europa.eu/info/implementing-and-delegated-acts/comitology_en.
12
See Final Communiqué, supra note 3. The Terms of Reference of the NAC address five areas: Time
and Frequency of Sessions, Location of the Council Sessions, Chairmanship, Languages and Permanent Coordination. Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
NATO Secretary General, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (Apr. 13, 2016), https://www.nato.int/cps/
en/natohq/topics_50094.htm?.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
NATO’s two Strategic Commanders are, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR),
responsible for operations, and the Supreme Allied Commander, Transformation (SACT), responsible for
transformation. Military Organisation and Structures, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (May 25, 2018).
www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49608.htm.
19
The MC advises the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on military policy and strategy. Some scholars see
the relationship between the NAC and the MC is as ambiguous as is that of the MC and the Supreme
Headquarters. See HANS BORN & HEINER HÄNGGI, THE ‘DOUBLE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT’: PARLIAMENTARY
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Supreme Commander—SACEUR and SACT—provide military advice and
expertise to the NAC and the MC, and lead the NATO Command Structure,
NATO Force Structure and the structures and assets placed at the disposal of
NATO.20 Their Supreme Headquarters, Supreme Headquarters Allied Forces
Europe (SHAPE) and HQ Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT),
and all their subordinate headquarters support the Supreme Commanders.21
NATO’s Command Structure (NCS) is the backbone of NATO. It is
composed of permanent multinational headquarters at the strategic,
operational and component levels of command, distributed
geographically and commonly funded…. Today, NATO maintains
personnel in 6,800 posts across seven commands [and multiple units].
The reforms also improved the NCS’s operability with the NATO
Force Structure (NFS). The NFS is a distinct pool of Allied national
and multinational forces and headquarters placed at the Alliance’s
disposal on a permanent or temporary basis.22

Permanent representatives of the NAC meet, at a minimum, on a weekly
basis.23 The minsters of foreign affairs meet twice a year, while the ministers of
defense meet three times each year. “NATO Summits” are held occasionally and
the heads of NATO’s state and government attend them.24
NATO is an intergovernmental international organization, not a
supranational one. NATO Members maintain their sovereignty at the Council
and at any of the subordinate committees. NATO members are also responsible
for their own decisions.25 This is clearly identified in NATO’s comments made
in the United Nations Draft Articles of Responsibilities of International

ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE USE OF FORCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL AUSPICES, Ch. IV (Born & Hänggi
eds.,2004).
20
NATO
Command
Structure,
NORTH
ATLANTIC
TREATY
ORG.
(Feb.
2018)
www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_02/1802-Factsheet-NATO-Command-Structure_en.pdf.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
North Atlantic Council, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/
natohq/topics_49763.htm?,
24
Id.
25
Responsibility of Int’l Orgs. Docs. Of the Fifty-Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/637, at 7 (2004).
legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_545.pdf (last visited 24 February 2019).
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Organizations (DARIO), which state that “[e]ach member State retains full
responsibility for its decisions [taken within the North Atlantic Council].”26
II. ARTICLE 9 AND SUBSIDIARY BODIES
A. Subsidiary Bodies
In Article 9 the drafters gave the NAC authority to set up subsidiary bodies
as necessary.27 Of note, Articles 3 and 5 appear to be the leading elements of
NATO’s institutionalization. The former requires institutions to maintain and
develop individual and collective capacities to resist an armed attack, and the
latter requires structures and procedures to coordinate the actions deemed
necessary to restore and maintain the security after an armed attack occurs.28
Article 4 of the Treaty enables the interaction of Articles 3, 5, and 9.29 This
readiness to resist and respond to an armed attack allows the Alliance to become
an Organization. The Korean War and the deteriorating security situation in
Europe presented a credible scenario against which a decision was made to
create NATO bodies.30 The first NATO body, and international organization of
NATO, was the SHAPE.31
The International Law Commission (ILC) in its commentaries to DARIO
posits that among the rules of the different international organizations there are
a variety of interpretations of what is an organ of the organization.32 The
commentaries state, “[a]n example of a very economical list is provided by

26

Id.
SNEŽANA. TRIFUNOVSKA, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION 47 (2nd ed., 2010) (“[T]he need
to create subsidiary bodies that would make possible the functioning of the Alliance became immediately
apparent. Setting up of a number of bodies led to the establishment of NATO, which implements the Council’s
decision and provide practical means of collaboration between Member States in areas determine by the
Washington Treaty.”).
28
See North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1, art. 3, 5.
29
See id., art. 4.
30
Andres B. Munoz Mosquera & Mette Hartov, NATO International Military Headquarters in THE
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF VISITING FORCES 459 (D. Fleck eds., 2nd ed., 2018).
31
“The French delegation is perfectly conscious of the fact that SHAPE in its character of an international
organisation is different from the Franco-American organisation.” (emphasis added). Provision of Budget for
SHAPE.: Note by the Secretary, NATO ARCHIVES, Appendix B, 13, 22 (February 20, 1951),
archives.nato.int/uploads/r/null/3/1/31054/D-D_51_52_ENG.pdf.
32
U.N. Doc. A/66/10, supra note 9, at 52.
27
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NATO. Article 9 of the Treaty establishes a single organ, the NAC, which is
given the competence to create ‘subsidiary bodies as may be necessary.’”33
The ILC considers the scope of the term “organ” to be governed by the “rules
of the organization”—i.e., it is up to an international organization to define its
own organs.34 NATO members define its own organs based on the simple, yet
powerful wording of Article 9, which vests powers on the NAC to set up bodies
as may be necessary. Indeed, Escott Reid argues that Article 9 of the Treaty “is
a broad rather than specific definition of functions and is not intended to exclude
the performance at appropriate levels in the organization of such planning for
the implementation of Articles 3 and 5 or other functions as the Parties may
agree to be necessary.”35
As particularity can be seen in Articles 1 and 2 of the 1951 Ottawa
Agreement where the term “subsidiary bodies” is separately defined from
“military bodies.”36 However, the broadness noted by Reid, who was a witness
to the crafting of the Treaty, makes sense under the following facts: (a) the first
NAC-approved international institution was precisely a military body,
SHAPE;37 (b) the travaux préparatoires38 of the Deputies, which was the NAC
permanent representatives at the time, extended the Ottawa Agreement to Allied
Headquarters when the NATO 1951 Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)
provisions were not sufficient—hybridity of the Paris Protocol;39 (c) the NAC
created “subsidiary bodies” in their variant of “subsidiary military bodies”
subordinate to the Defence Committee;40 and (d) in 1951 the Supreme
33

Id.
“Article 2 (c) ‘organ of an international organization’ means any person or entity which has that status
in accordance with the rules of the organization” Id. at 49.
35
ESCOTT REID, TIME OF FEAR AND HOPE, THE MAKING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY 1947-1949
267 (McClelland & Steward, eds. 1977) (emphasis added). Reid takes this interpretation verbatim from the
wording of the ‘Minutes of the Eighteen Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, March 15,
1948’ held in Washington. Minutes of the Eighteenth Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security,
March 15, 1949 in F OREIGN RELATIONS OF THE U NITED S TATES , 1949, W ESTERN E UROPE , IV, O FFICE OF
THE H ISTORIAN 223–24 (1949).
36
Agreement on the Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, National Representatives and
International Staff signed in Ottawa [hereinafter Ottawa Agreement].
37
Final Communiqué, Dec. 18–19, 1950.
38
English translation: “preparatory work.”
39
Protocol on the Status of Allied Headquarters, January 3, 1952, Doc. D-D(52)2, in Joseph Snee, NATO
Agreements on Status: Travaux Préparatoires INT’L L. STUD., NAVAL WAR C., Vol. LIV, 592 (1961).
40
See Defence Committee, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG., http://archives.nato.int/defence-committee2 (“The Military Committee, the Standing Group, a sub-committee of the Military Committee, the five strategic
regional groups (the Northern European Regional Planning Group, Western European Regional Planning Group,
Southern European-Western Mediterranean Regional Planning Group, Canadian-United States Regional
34
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Headquarters took over the functions and responsibilities of a selected group of
“subsidiary military bodies,” the Regional Planning Groups. Three groups came
under SHAPE and one under the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
(SACLANT),41 which “serve as a basis for the subordinate commands
[headquarters] which would each be under a Commander-in-Chief.”42 These
aforementioned reasons show why the term “subsidiary bodies” can be
legitimately used for denomination of the Supreme Headquarters and their
subordinate headquarters. Paul Reuter gives an explanation to this phenomenon
through the contention that the “organes subsidiaries”43 are founded by the
voluntary manifestation of the organization.44 Reuter presents the “voluntary
manifestation” as the element that creates subsidiary bodies.45 In other words,
the fact the NAC created civil and military organs, like the International Staff,
and the Supreme Headquarters and its subordinate headquarters, makes these by
their origin, subsidiary bodies.46 However, it is NATO practice to not use the
term “subsidiary bodies” but rather the more general “NATO bodies” in
reference to entities related to the organization.
The term “subsidiary body” can be used in an expansive manner and intends
to cover all bodies, civil and military, under the authority of the NAC. However,
the practice of using the term “NATO body” to avoid the use of “subsidiary
body,” has created confusion among entities which are not part of the Ottawa
bodies or the Paris NATO Command Structure. Such entities include those of
the NATO Force Structure, other assets at the disposal of NATO, and Centres
of Excellence, as well as the field headquarters in operations to which NATO
contributes.47
On the one hand, the term “NATO body” may apply the Paris Protocol to
entities of the NATO Force Structure, specific structures and other assets at the
disposal of NATO, as well as to Centres of Excellence. This takes place per

Planning Group and the North Atlantic Ocean Regional Planning Group), and the Military Production and
Supply Board.”).
41
The fifth group, U.S.-Canada, did not change authorities.
42
HASTINGS LIONEL ISMAY, NATO-THE FIRST 5 YEARS 1949–1954, 72 (1954) (emphasis added).
43
English transalation,“subsidiary organs.”
44
Paul Reuter, Les Organes Subsidiaires des Organisations Internationales, in HOMMAGE D’UNE
GÉNÉRATION DE JURISTES AU PRÉSIDENT BASDEVANT 423–25 (1960).
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Andrés B. Muñoz Mosquera, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: An International Institutional
Law Perspective (Part I: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: From the United Nations Charter to a
Dynamic Institutionalization)(Thesis pending on defense) 61–67 (2019).
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NAC decision based on Article 14 of the Paris Protocol and NAC document CM(69)22.48 This is done under the denomination “NATO Military Body” and
gives them the status granted to “international military headquarters” under the
Paris Protocol. The status of “international military headquarters” is not to say
they fully enjoy the legal position established per the Paris Protocol, since these
headquarters and units only receive the privileges and immunities of the Paris
Protocol and not its legal status—legal personality, legal status, powers—and
responsibility.49 Rather, these entities exist prior to being granted international
status; their legal personality is objective, and their legal capacity and powers,
as well as responsibility, are established by: (a) the concept by which they were
created; (b) the provisions of their respective Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) for their administration, financing, manning and governance;50 and (c)
the decisions taken at the senior policy and resources committee formed by the
different states signatories of their respective founding MOU. Therefore, the fact
of being a “NATO [Military] Body” does not make them “subsidiary bodies” or
suggest that they are established by the NAC pursuant to Article 9. Rather, they
have a national or multinational nature; they are not financed by the NATO
common budget nor are they directly subordinate to SHAPE51 or HQ SACT.
Instead, they are resourced and controlled by the participating states
contributions.
On the other hand, and with respect to field headquarters, an analysis on their
applicable legal framework removes any dangerous confusion intended to apply
the term “NATO body” to them. NATO governing treaties52 apply, totally or
partially, to “NATO bodies,” while U.N. Security Council resolutions, mission-

48

J.A. Burger, Headquarters IFOR/SFOR in FLECK, supra note 30, at 329 (see Document C-M(69)22).
Legal position is made of legal status (legal personality, legal capacity, powers), privileges and
immunities and responsibility. “The term ‘Legal position’ is coined by Bekker based on the relevant work of ElErian and others in the International Law Commission.” See PIETER H.F. BEKKER, THE LEGAL POSITION OF
INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS. A FUNCTIONAL NECESSITY ANALYSIS OF THEIR LEGAL STATUS AND
IMMUNITIES 51 (1994); see also El-Erian, [1963] 1 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 298, ¶ 110, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1963.
50
Andrés B. Muñoz Mosquera, Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU): A Philosophical and Empirical
Approach (Part I)’ (2014), NATO LEGAL GAZETTE, 34, 55–69, <www.ismllw.org/NATO%20LEGAL%
20GAZETTE/Legal%20GazetteIssueNo%2034.pdf>.
51
However, they have Command and Control arrangements in the form of Technical Arrangements,
which give SACEUR (SHAPE) the Operational Command, while the administration remains in the hands of the
constituents of those organizations or entities.
52
See generally Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of their
Forces (June 19, 1951) [hereinafter NATO SOFA]; Ottawa Agreement, supra note 36; The 1952 Protocol on
the Status of International Military Headquarters set up pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty (Aug. 28, 1952)
[hereinafter Paris Protocol]; and their supplementary agreements.
49
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specific status of forces/military technical agreements, or specific bilateral
agreements—Afghanistan, Iraq—apply to field headquarters.53 The use of the
term “NATO body” for field headquarters is an erroneous practice from a legal
standpoint since it creates legal uncertainty and confuses the legal position of
those multinational and in-theatre organizations—which do not fall within the
NATO governing treaties—with that of the genuine and unique NATO bodies.
The above shows that NATO’s institutionalization has not been well studied
and many still think that NATO is a monolithic international organization.
However, although NATO is an international organization, it is formed by three
other and distinct international organizations54 with different legal positions.
These international organizations are: the “Organization”—known colloquially
as the NATO HQ—although in practice it goes much beyond and includes the
International Staff, International Military Staff and Agencies—and the two
“Supreme Headquarters”—which form the NATO Command Structure. The
former is governed by the 1951 Ottawa Agreement,55 and the latter two derive
their status from the 1952 Paris Protocol,56 which enjoys a hybrid nature. Finally,
other bodies depend on these treaties via both specific charter or activation and
delegation of authority. This does not include entities or organizations of the
NATO Force Structure, specific structures, assets at the disposal of NATO, and
Centres of Excellence.
On the hybrid nature of the Paris Protocol, the drafters understood that
International Military Headquarters would be something beyond any visiting
force.
With regard to such headquarters and their personnel, civilian and
military, the Protocol has two purposes. First, it adapts to the
headquarters and personnel the provisions laid down in the Status of
Forces Agreement in regard to sending States and their personnel
(Articles 3-8). Secondly, it creates a special status for such
headquarters which is analogous to that created for the Council and

53
See also, Andrés B. Muñoz Mosquera & N. Chalanaouli, North Atlantic Treaty. Travaux Preparatoires
Reconstructed (2019) (under peer review) (copy on file with author).
54
This format is replicated in the World Bank [Group], i.e., it is an international organization formed by
international organizations with their own distinct legal positions.
55
Ottawa Agreement, supra note 36.
56
See NATO SOFA, supra note 52; Paris Protocol, supra note 52.
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its subsidiary civilian bodies by the Agreement of 20 September 1951
[Ottawa Agreement].57

Based on this understanding, the drafters of the three general multilateral
treaties specified their intent and goal. It is submitted that the Paris Protocol is
dependent upon both the NATO SOFA—expressly cited in the Paris Protocol’s
provisions—and the Ottawa Agreement—expressly mentioned in the travaux
préparatoires—D-D (52) 2:
26. The object of the present Protocol is to apply to Allied
Headquarters the Agreement of 19 June 1951 on the Status of Armed
Forces. For the question not covered by that Agreement—and for this
question only—it is possible to refer to the Agreement signed at
Ottawa on 20 September 1951, concerning the status of NATO civilian
agencies.58

B.

The Principle of Consultation

Articles 2, 3, and 9 of the Treaty implicate Article 4.59 Consultation gives
the Alliance its “political dimension.”60 Moreover, “the consultative provision
should be construed broadly in order to enable [NATO members] to air their
interest before the response is taken … in a manner most likely to promote
cooperative efforts.”61
NATO’s main institution, the NAC, bases its procedures on the “principle
of consultation”62 per Article 4 for effectively and efficiently implementing the
functions and principles of the Treaty.63
Per Article 4, “[t]he Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of
any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of
the Parties is threatened.”64 There is no decision by majority; NAC decisions are

57

Snee, supra note 39, at 6 (emphasis added).
Protocol on the Status of Allied Headquarters – Report and Comments by France and SHAPE on the
Draft Protocol and the Draft France-SHAPE Agreement (Jan. 3, 1952), ¶ 26, in Snee, supra note 39, at 596.
59
The Evolution of NATO Political Consultation 1949-1962, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG., II, (May
2, 1963), www.nato.int/archives/docu/d630502e.htm>.
60
Consultation Process and Article 4, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (Mar. 17, 2016), https://www.
nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49187.htm.
61
Frederic Kirgis, NATO Consultations as a Component of National Decisionmaking 73 AJIL, 372, 374–
76 (1979).
62
Consultation Process and Article 4, supra note 63.
63
See North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1, art. 4.
64
Id. art. 9.
58
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supported by and “are the expression of the collective will of all the sovereign
states that are members of the Alliance and are accepted by all of them.”65
There are no majorities of any type, and since the 1970s the NAC abandoned
the practice of “unanimity” for daily decision-making and adopted gradually that
of “consensus.” The decision-making process of consensus helps Member States
to maintain sovereignty when participating in the NAC. Today, unanimity is
used only for the admission of new members in accordance with Article 10.66 At
the NAC there is not primus inter pares,67 since all members have the same right
to express their views.
Article 4 not only gives “soul” to NATO bodies created by the NAC under
Article 9, but it also builds resilience and capacities for self-defense and
collective-defense. Additionally, Article 9, via Article 4, gives NATO
constituents the ability to address security and defense matters beyond Articles
5 and 6:
[T]he principle that NATO political consultation is not necessarily
confined to the area defined in 1949 follows from the Treaty which
mentions no such geographical limits to consultations: Article 6 refers
to the commitments mentioned in Article 5 not to Article 4 or other
relevant articles. The desirability of NATO consultation going beyond
the NATO area was subsequently reaffirmed at the Ottawa meeting in
1951, by the Committee of the North Atlantic Community (Pearson
Committee), of 1951, by Three Wise Men in 1956, by Mr. Spaak’s
Political Appraisal Report in 1958 and, finally, in the Long-Term
Planning Exercise of 1960/61.68

The creation of the NAC under Article 9 shows “the will of governments to
consult.”69 This gives NATO Members’ common organs democratic status,
which explains the “combination of Article 4—the obligation/commitment—
and Article 9—the forum/platform—that creates the skeleton of NATO’s
institutional ‘regime.’”70 In 1952 and based on these foundations, the NAC
reorganized and augmented its incipient structures—at the time only military:
SHAPE and its planning groups—to reinforce and particularize NATO’s

65

North Atlantic Council, supra note 23.
A thorough analysis of the history and paradoxes of NATO’s decision-making process can be found
in, Muñoz Mosquera, supra note 47, at 82–101.
67
English translation: “First among equals.”
68
The Evolution of NATO Political Consultation 1949-1962, supra note 59.
69
Id. at V.
70
See Muñoz Mosquera, supra note 47, at 49–50.
66
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institutionalization71 and to add the civilian structures of the International Staff
and civil agencies.
III. ARTICLE 9 AND ARTICLES 3 AND 5
Article 9 refers to the immediate implementation of Articles 3 and 5 by the
defense committee.72 This implies that structures and procedures run by NATO
bodies will “maintain, and develop, individual and collective capacity to resist
an armed attack.73 Furthermore, should an attack occur, actions will be taken “in
concert” to restore and maintain the security in the North Atlantic area.74
The inherent right of self-defense is considered the cornerstone for
collectively acting to restore international peace and security and developing
collective capabilities to resist an armed attack. These capabilities are not
necessarily of a military nature. Current hybrid environments prove this
statement to be true.
René Mayer argues, in analyzing Article 3 in the context of Article 9, that
the parties to the Treaty intend to implement the mutual assistance by
coordinating their defenses.75 This coordination requires time to mature, and
agents and institutions to keep the momentum of the international obligations
approved through the Treaty. This goal can be reached only with a proper
network of functional institutions whose tasks are fully oriented in the
framework of the functions and principles of NATO. This network shall
contribute to mission success and satisfy the collective interests and needs of the
constituents. Today Article 3’s international obligations take the form of
memoranda of understanding, normally responding to a concept prepared by
SHAPE or HQ SACT and approved by the nations at the MC, providing an
opportunity for NATO members to jointly develop capabilities on a
multinational or bilateral basis.
Article 5 carries NATO’s seed for dynamic institutionalization as set up in
Article 9. Article 5 follows the U.N. Charter formulation as Arthur Vandenberg

71
The Contours of Today’s NATO, NATO DECLASSIFIED, https://www.nato.int/ebookshop/video/
declassified/#/en/encyclopedia/from_treaty_to_organization/new_structures,_faces_and_home/the_contours_o
f_today_s_nato/.
72
See North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1, art. 9.
73
See id.
74
See id.
75
RENÉ MAYER, LE PACT DE L’ATLANTIQUE, PAIX OU GUERRE? 20 (1952).
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proposed76 and is drafted as a strong collective resolution with respect to
responding to an armed attack. “In particular, Article 5 with its recognition that
an armed attack against one of the parties is an attack against them all, and its
reference to the use of force, is much stronger that at one time we thought
possible.”77
It is crucial to understand why Article 9 is an Article 5 enabler. NATO’s
collective defense is first based on the following agreement: each NATO
member is sovereign to judge the casus foederis78 as well as the type of
contribution or conduct it wants to take while acting in self-defense. Second,
after the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York and Washington, NATO
members exhibited a willingness to apply Article 5 to non-conventional
attacks.79 NATO’s adaptability to these new requirements is the result of
NATO’s flexible institutionalization, which integrates NATO’s collective
defense into the institutional network created by the Treaty. “[NATO’s]
collective defense has become a more integrated part of the continuum of
institutional cooperation and consultation activities . . . [and] Article 5 can no
longer be viewed as a Cold War provision . . . .” 80
NATO’s dynamic institutionalization can also be seen in the different
“strategic concepts” the NAC has approved since the 1990s.81 A resilient and
adaptable institutionalized “community of interest” feeds NATO’s strength.
Additionally, NATO’s institutions are adaptable enablers, capable of
confronting existing threats by keeping alive the 70-year-old NATO’s
momentum. The 1991 Strategic Concept allowed NATO to enter the new outof-area approach.82 However, it was not until the 1999 Strategic Concept that
the out-of-area operations were formally taken as part of NATO’s functions and

76
“[There is nothing in the North Atlantic pact] which is not written within the four corners of the United
Nations Charter.” THE OTTAWA JOURNAL, Mar. 19, 1949, at 4.
77
Foreign Office document FO 371/79238, Z2476/1074/72/G. Brief for Mr. Bevin for Consultative
Council meeting, Mar. 14, 1949 in T. Insall and P. Salmon, The Brussels and North Atlantic Treaties, 19471949, in DOCUMENTS ON BRITISH POLICY OVERSEAS, SERIES I, VOL. X, 431 (Insall & Salmon eds., 2015).
78
English Translation: “A case or event covered by the provisions or stipulations of a treaty.”
79
NATO Secretary General, Lord George Robertson, Speech to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly,
Ottawa, Canada, Oct. 9, 2001.
80
Kenneth Klima, Interpretations of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, 1949-2002 83 (2002) (thesis,
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California).
81
“[P]rovisions of the NAT were reinterpreted and given new meaning by the parties…” REID supra note
35, at 103.
82
The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. ¶ 12 (Nov. 8, 1991),
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23847.htm.
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purposes.83 This approach is consistent with NATO’s function of providing
security and defense to its Members and is “fueled” by Articles 4 and 9. In this
respect NATO’s transformation into an institutional regime in 1950—i.e., the
materialization of Article 9—may explain NATO’s survivability over the years
in several distinct international scenarios. NATO’s institutionalization enablers
and processes enshrined in the Treaty, as it has been described above,
predisposed NATO, from the very beginning, to institutionalization and
adaptability. This permits NATO Members to stay ready to successfully
confront external conventional and hybrid threats and stand for their individual
and collective interests.
[T]he establishment of institutional regimes can only succeed where a
community of interest exists and where these regimes can work in an
interdependent environment. Decades ago, western nations were
conscious of the existence of an Atlantic community of interest.
However, it was not until after two world wars and an actual
unequivocal threat on their common western identity that procedures
were needed to safeguard the community of interest. This idea [of
NATO] was enacted through the establishment of working institutions
within a legal framework. However, while the inspiring idea of NATO
has remained throughout the institution’s history, it does not guarantee
the survival of a function-oriented institutionalized regime. The
materialization of the idea was also affected by reality. Since 1949, the
evolution of international relations has shaped NATO by subjecting it
to a reality check inspired by the principle of the functional necessity.
This has characterized the organization as a transformative
institution.84

The natural “hand over-take over” process between idealism and
functionalism is an important element of NATO’s success.
CONCLUSION
Through the Treaty, NATO’s community of interest depends on a legal
framework to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security.
This is done, inter alia, consistent with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. NATO’s
83
“24. Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be covered by
Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. However, Alliance security must also take account of the global
context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature… Arrangements exist within
the Alliance for consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and, where appropriate,
co-ordination of their efforts including their responses to risks of this kind.” The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. ¶¶ 3, 24 (Apr. 10, 1999), https://www.nato.int/cps/su/natohq/official_texts_
27433.htm?selectedLocale=en.
84
See Muñoz Mosquera, supra note 47, at 56–57.
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structures and procedures make this contribution real; its international
institutions are in charge of implementing the organization’s functions and
principles.
Although Article 9 was immediately implemented in 1949, it was not until
1950 and the Korean War that NATO understood that it was an “alliance”
without teeth. In December 1950 General Eisenhower took over the task of
NATO’s institutionalization and created an integrated military structure headed
by SHAPE, which was the “Organization” well before the international staff,
civil agencies or other supreme headquarters.
NATO’s institutionalization remains a living process, which continues to
evolve through the review of existing conventional and hybrid threats and by
succinctly adapting NATO’s institutions to confront them.85 It is an impressive
dynamic practice whose legal frame is Article 9 and the “rules of the
organization.”
The NAC is created by Article 9 and is NATO’s main political decisionmaking body. Additionally, and as envisaged in Article 9, the NAC is supported
by several subordinate boards and committees, while member States retain
sovereignty through NATO’s consensus decision-making process.
NATO has been poorly—or not at all—studied under international
institutional law. As a result, it is the misconception of many that NATO is a
monolithic international organization with one legal position. A thorough study
of original correspondence and exchanges during the Treaty negotiations, the
travaux préparatoires and texts of NATO’s general multilateral agreements
indicates an unprecedented international organization. NATO is, indeed, an
international organization, but it is at the same time the “container” of three other
85
“[A]t the February 2018 Defence Ministerial Conference, the leaders agreed to bolster maritime
security, logistics and military mobility, and cyber defence. A new joint force command for the Atlantic will aid
the protection of sea lines of communication between North America and Europe. The establishment of a new
command to support logistics, reinforcement and military mobility will facilitate the movement of troops and
equipment for NATO’s collective deterrence and defence. New elements within each of the commands including
a new cyber operations centre at Supreme Headquarters Allied Forces Europe (SHAPE) are aimed at adapting
and further strengthening NATO’s defences for today’s dynamic security environment. These reforms will also
improve NATO’s ability to integrate the NATO Force Structure (NFS), a group of Allied national and
multinational forces as well as headquarters at the NATO’s disposal. This adaptation directly supports the three
core Alliance tasks: collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. While a large scale and
complex effort, the reformed NATO Command Structure will maximise the deterrent effects of NATO forces
and ensure realignment to today’s geopolitical context in time of peace, crisis and conflict.” NATO Command
Structure Adaptation: The Way Ahead, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. shape.nato.int/structure/nato-commandstructure-adaptation/the-way-ahead.
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international organizations with their own and distinct legal position and with a
series of subordinate elements; all constitute the different NATO bodies.
NATO’s three international organizations are an original and democratic
arrangement exemplifying NATO constituents’ interest in separating the civil
and military institutions of NATO. It also illustrates that the NAC runs NATO’s
institutions, not the Secretary General or the Supreme Commanders. The NAC
is the actual primus inter pares among NATO’s institutions and its aim is to
generate harmony among the different common organs: Harmonia est unitas in
varietate86 while implementing the Articles 3, 4, and 5 and balancing the
political and military dimensions of NATO with the sovereignty of the Allied
Member States.
Robert Jordan summarizes NATO’s particular and unprecedented
institutionalization: “NATO stands as much in the growing tradition of
functional international organization as in that of military alliances. In NATO
the two are intertwined to an unprecedented extent.”87

86
87

English Translation: “Harmony is unity in diversity.”
ROBERT JORDAN, THE NATO INTERNATIONAL STAFF/SECRETARIAT 1952–1957 vii (1967).

